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And to my husband -thank you for putting up with all the long nights and weekends and making my life pleasurable when I was busy and down! ABSTRACT Typically, computer viruses and other malware are detected by searching for a string of bits which is found in the virus or malware. Such a string can be viewed as a "fingerprint" of the virus. These "fingerprints" are not generally unique; however they can be used to make rapid malware scanning feasible. This fingerprint is often called a signature and the technique of detecting viruses using signatures is known as signaturebased detection [8] .
Today, virus writers often camouflage their viruses by using code obfuscation techniques in an effort to defeat signature-based detection schemes. So-called metamorphic viruses are viruses in which each instance has the same functionality but differs in its internal structure. Metamorphic viruses differ from polymorphic viruses in the method they use to hide their signature. While polymorphic viruses primarily rely on encryption for signature obfuscation, metamorphic viruses hide their signature via "mutating" their own code [3] .
The paper [1] provides a rigorous proof that metamorphic viruses can bypass any signature-based detection, provided the code obfuscation has been done carefully based on a set of specified rules. Specifically, according to [1] , if dead code is added and the control flow is changed sufficiently by inserting jump statements, the virus cannot be detected.
In this project we first developed a code obfuscation engine conforming to the rules in [1] . We then used this engine to create metamorphic variants of a seed virus (created using the PS-MPK virus creation kit [15] ) and demonstrated the validity of the assertion in [1] about metamorphic viruses and signature based detectors. In the second phase of this project we validated another theory advanced in [2] , namely, that machine learning based methodsspecifically ones based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM) can detect metamorphic viruses. In other words, we show that a collection of metamorphic viruses which are (provably) undetectable via signature detection techniques can nevertheless be detected using an HMM approach. Files ............................................................................................................................. 
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INTRODUCTION
In today's age, where a majority of the transactions involving sensitive information access happen on computers and over the internet, it is absolutely imperative to treat information security as a concern of paramount importance.
Computer viruses and other malware have been in existence from the very early days of the personal computer and continue to pose a threat to home and enterprise users alike.
As anti-virus technologies evolved to combat these viruses, the virus writers too changed their tactics and mode of operation to create more complex and harder to detect viruses and the game of cat and mouse continued. In fact, the paper [1] provides a rigorous proof that metamorphic viruses can bypass any signature-based detection, provided the code obfuscation has been done based on a set of specified rules. These rules include dead code insertion and jump statements to obfuscate the control flow.
For this thesis a code obfuscating engine conforming to the rules specified in [1] has been created and using it we demonstrate that viruses obfuscated with this engine are not detectable by commercial virus scanners employing signature based detection. A second experiment was then carried out to test the hypothesis in [2] that metamorphic viruses can be detected by machine learning based methods (in this case employing Hidden Markov Models or HMMs). The detection engine in [2] was tested against metamorphic viruses generated by our obfuscation engine to determine the effectiveness of this detection approach.
This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides background information and some history on how viruses evolved, from the point of view of detection avoidance. We also consider various techniques used by virus writers including 
Encrypted and Polymorphic viruses
The next stage in virus evolution produced viruses which used encryption as a technique 
Obfuscation techniques used in metamorphic viruses
Metamorphic viruses can obfuscate their data flow by various techniques including register exchange (using different registers in each generation), instruction swap (replacing instructions with other equivalent ones), permutation (subroutine reordering), transposition (reordering instructions which are not order dependant) and dead code insertion (adding nop and other "do nothing" statements).
They can also obfuscate their control flow can by extensive use of jump instructions.
Some metamorphic viruses carry their own metamorphic engines. For example, Zperm carries along its own metamorphic engine, which is known as the Real Permuting Engine or RPME [12] . Other metamorphic generators operate "offline", in the sense that the metamorphic engine is independent of the virus itself. Figure 3 Regardless of the actual technique used to obfuscate the virus body, metamorphic viruses have one shared characteristic which gives them their potency and makes them difficult to detectthey do not provide any moment in their evolution when a constant code body is completely observable. Note that this is in contrast to polymorphic viruses.
Metamorphic virus generation toolkits
Virus writing used to be the purview of a few dedicated "enthusiasts". However, the past several years have seen the emergence of several virus generation toolkits which has made creating a potent virus very easy. These toolkits range from rudimentary ones to very elaborate tools with GUIs which can generate polymorphic and metamorphic viruses. Some of the more sophisticated toolkits come complete with anti-debugging and emulation resistant techniques built in. VX Heavens [14] , which is a resource for virus creators and researchers, lists well over a hundred virus generation toolkits. Some of the more advanced toolkits include the Next Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK), Phalcon/Skism Mass Produced Code Generator (PS-MPC), Mass Code Generator
For the purposes of this project the PS-MPC toolkit [17] has been used to generate sample viruses. According to Szor [3] , PS-MPC generates viruses that are not only polymorphic but have different decryption routines and structures in variants.
Other malware self-defense techniques (Rootkits, Packers etc)
In addition to the techniques discussed earlier in this section there are several other techniques employed by virus writers to avoid being detected by anti-virus programs.
Some of the more common ones include Rootkits, Packers and anti-debugging techniques.
Rootkits are programs that reside in a computer system without authorization and take control of the operating system [6] . They are designed to conceal malicious programs in the system to make it very difficult to detect the malicious programs using antivirus or other security software. Execution Path Modification (modifying a chain of system calls and using API level hooks to hijack system functions) and Direct Kernel Object Modification (modifying information or commands directly in the kernel source) are some common techniques used by Rootkit technologies. The deeper these Rootkits are located in the system the more difficult it is to find them. Newer trends in Rootkits include Firmware rootkits which attack the firmware supplied with devices and Virtualized rootkits which modify the boot sequence, load themselves instead of the original OS and then load the original OS as an enslaved virtual machine [18] .
Packers are programs that compress viruses making them difficult to be detected. When virus writers try to create new viruses by building on or modifying existing viruses the heart of the virus remains the same with some extra lines of code. Viruses created in this manner are hence easily detected by many virus scanners using pattern based detection.
By packing the files virus creators bypass the problem as changing even one byte in the unpacked executable results in a very differently byte sequenced packed file. Figure 4 [6] below illustrates the difference between a packed and unpacked virus executable. 
Current state of virus detection techniques
Anti-virus technologies today use a variety of techniques to detect viruses. The objectives of these technologies are to detect viruses with a high degree of accuracy, produce very few false positives, and accomplish the detection process in a reasonable amount of time.
Some of the different detection techniques employed today includes:
• Pattern based detection
• Emulation based detection
• Static analysis based detection
• Heuristics and statistical methods Below, we briefly discuss each of these techniques.
String scanning or pattern based detection
The most popular technique in anti-virus scanners today is pattern based detection. It is not as effective as some other techniques but it can be performed more quickly. This technique involves extracting a unique sequence of bits from a known virus and this sample is subsequently used like a fingerprint to match against while scanning for existence of the virus. Care has to be taken when choosing the bit sequence to minimize the number of false positives and at the same time match the virus and (ideally) possible variants. Sometimes statistical techniques are also used to extract these patterns. Figure 6 [4] shows an example of a search pattern for the "Stoned" boot sector virus. In this case, the bit sequence selected was chosen by observing a behavioral peculiarity of the virus (it reads the boot sector of the diskette four times, resetting the disk between each try). Second generation pattern based detectors use more advanced techniques such as "smart scanning" (ignoring nop instructions), using wildcards (allowing skipping of bytes and byte ranges), generic matching (using a single string to potentially match a family of viruses), near exact identification (using two search strings instead of one), using a checksum of a constant range found in the virus body and, finally, the most accurate methodexact identification (using checksums of all the constant bits found in the virus).
Emulation based detection
Emulation based detection is a powerful anti-virus technique where the virus is executed in a controlled environment (a virtual machine, or VM, emulating the instructions of the real processor and the interface of the operating system) and the behavior of the virus is observed. This technique is particularly useful with polymorphic and encrypted viruses where the virus is allowed to decrypt itself and then a snapshot of the decrypted virus can be captured for analysis from the virtual machines memory structures.
One drawback of emulation-based detection is that the virus execution in the VM environment can sometimes take relatively long, especially when the virus has many garbage instructions in a loop. Code optimization techniques are sometimes applied in such cases for faster execution. In addition to the detection methods discussed in detail in this chapter, other methods like statistical analysis and machine learning based methods have also been used. One such technique (HMMs) will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Static analysis based detection

HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS APPLIED TO METAMORPHIC VIRUS DETECTION
Metamorphic viruses have an interesting property which make behavioral analysis based approaches a viable option for detecting these viruses [2] . Specifically -the generational variants of the same metamorphic virus family despite their differences do share a high degree of similarity especially when compared to normal files because they tend to differ a lot from normal files. This can be seen from Figure 8 The second phase of this project aims to demonstrate that viruses created by our code obfuscation engine can be identified by this HMM based method described in [2] .
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) are state machine based statistical models which can be used to describe a set of observations generated by a stochastic process. Such processes (also called Markov processes) can be modeled as a sequence of states, where the progression to the next state depends solely on the present state but not on the past states.
The underlying stochastic process modeled in a HMM is "hidden" and all we can see is the sequence of observations associated with the states. The idea here is to make use of the information observed about the process to gain an understanding of the underlying Markov process [18] . HMMs are well suited for statistical pattern analysis and have been applied to solve various problems of this nature including speech pattern analysis and biological sequence analysis.
Training the HMM
1.1.1.
When a HMM is trained on a particular data set the states in the model represent features of the data set under observation and are associated with a probability distribution for the set of symbols under observation. The state transitions represent the transition probabilities between the observed states and have fixed values.
In [2] where HMM was applied to the problem of recognizing metamorphic viruses, the HMM states corresponded to features of the virus code, while the observations about the data (in this case metamorphic viruses) were instructions or opcodes making up the virus program. The idea here was that the HMM should after training be able to detect similarities between (and assign high probabilities to) the viruses from the same metamorphic family the model was trained on.
1.1.2.
Assembly code comparison and scoring
The comparison process used in [2] is graphically depicted in Figure 9 [2]. The process was first outlined by Mishra in [16] and is based on finding identical opcode sequences in the two programs. The first step is to extract opcodes from the program (comments, labels etc are excluded). Each opcode is then assigned a number and the sequence of opcodes in the two programs is compared to find common subsequences of size three. In phase three of our experiments we trained the HMM model described in [2] on metamorphic viruses created by our code obfuscation engine and then determined the similarity scores for other variants from the same family and also normal files. The experiment details and results are presented in chapter 5.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METAMORPHIC CODE GENERATOR
For this project we implemented a code morphing engine in Perl confirming to the specifications in [1]. This engine was intended to work with any given block of assembly code.
Background theory
The authors in [1] advance formal proofs for their specific code morphing suggestions.
Their contention is that the assembly code of the original virus should first be separated into small blocks of code based on two basic conditions. The first condition being that no block should end with any kind of jump instruction (JMP, JNZ, JGE etc). The second condition being that no block should end with a NOP operation. They also require that the virus carry its own metamorphic engine (i.e. the virus should know how to strip out the garbage code and re-order the blocks without outside assistance). From a virus detection point of view it is even harder to detect metamorphic viruses which do not carry their own metamorphic engine, hence we ignored this restriction in [1] and made the code morphing engine a separate entity.
After the code is separated into blocks the order of the code blocks has to be randomly 
Implementation details
For our project we chose a fixed block size of three for simplicity. Care was taken while splitting the code into blocks to make sure that none of the blocks ended with a jump instruction or a NOP instruction. If either of these types of instructions happened to be the last instruction of the block then we included the instruction succeeding the jump/NOP into the same block.
After the blocks were created, the starting address of each block was stored in an array and a conditional jump instruction pointing to the next block was added at the end of each block. This jump instruction was constructed depend on the result of a relatively complex mathematical equation. Complexity here implies that by manually reading the equation it is not apparent that the result is always the same for a set of given values. Since the equation always gives the same result, in all versions of the virus the jump instruction will always point to the logically correct sequence of blocks. Once these jump statements were inserted the blocks were randomly shuffled and blocks of dead code were inserted between blocks.
This project was implemented in three principal modules. The first module was designed to count the number of lines in the entire block of code and divide the program into smaller blocks of code. After that the second module stored the program in an array and appended conditional jump instructions to the end of each code block. The condition used to determine the value of integer 'k' is as follows: This was achieved in two steps. In the first step some small blocks of dead code were added at the end of the array storing the generated code blocks. The dead code blocks used were also the same as the ones mentioned in [1]. They are as follows: In the second step the small blocks of codes were randomly shuffled, in other words the logical order was changed and the results were stored in a text file. The above process i.e. the second step of third module was repeated multiple times (124 times in the case of this project) and the result is stored in different text files.
Care was taken while changing the logical order of the block to ensure that the first block was the same as that in the original code. According to authors in [1], all metamorphic viruses created by this engine always have the same entry and exit points/blocks. Hence the virus was not parsed once it has reached the end of the last block. Though the blocks were linked using the conditional jumps, the original logical sequence could not be achieved unless the first block was parsed first. The following sections provide more detailed descriptions of the code obfuscation process performed in our engine.
Detailed description of the code obfuscation process
The sequence of transformations performed by our code obfuscation engine is shown in Figure 13 . The virus code is first broken down into fixed size blocks. Blocks of dead code are then inserted followed by jump statement insertion and reordering of the blocks. Each step in the transformation will be explained in detail in subsequent sections. The first step in the obfuscation was breaking the code into fixed size blocks ( Figure 14) .
One important thing that we had to take care of in this stage was to make sure some sections of the assembly code, which needed to remain together like the .stack and .data sections, did not get split into different blocks. 
Jump statement insertion
At the end of the first step the blocks were still all in logically correct order.
The next step after chopping the code into these blocks involved the insertion of jump statements and this is depicted in the Figure 15 below.
Figure 15: Example of jump statement insertion
Dead code insertion
Once the block of conditional jump instructions were attached at the end of each block ( Figure 16 ). The blocks were stored in an array where each element in the array is a set of instructions and at the end of the array more dead code blocks were added. Each dead code block was stored in a singly array element. This increased the size of the array by the total number of garbage blocks. 
Block re-ordering
After the garbage code insertion the blocks were randomly shuffled. Figure 17 shows the control flow after this shuffle and this can be compared to the original code in Figure 14 .
The thing to note here is that the entry point for the virus always needs to be the original starting block. Thus block 1 being the starting block remains the same for all versions of the metamorphic virus. Similarly the program always ends with the end of last block and there is no garbage code or jump introduced after that. 
Test methodology
The experiments in this project consisted of three major phases. The first phase involved creating the seed virus required for this project and running baseline checks on the seed virus using pattern based detectors. Phase two involved running our code obfuscation engine on the seed virus to generate a family of metamorphic variants of the seed virus.
The final phase involved testing the metamorphic viruses created by our engine using pattern based detectors and a HMM based detector.
Creation of the seed virus
The virus generator used for creating the seed virus for this project was the Phalcon/Skism Mass Produced Code Generator (PS-MPC) from vxheavens.com [15] .
For this experiment the viruses we created were unencrypted. The PS-MPC virus creator generated the assembly language code for the virus which we assembled using MASM assembler and converted into an executable using the Tlink linker. After this the virus executable was scanned using the McAfee VirusScan scanner which recognized it as a virus and flagged a warning. Figure 18 shows a screenshot of the result we obtained when we ran McAfee VirusScan on the virus created using PS-MPC. 
Creation of metamorphic variants
After making certain that the seed virus was detected by a pattern based scanner it was run through our code morphing engine to create metamorphic versions. For the purposes of our experiment 120 variants of the seed virus were created. The code morphing engine reads the assembly code for the virus divides the code into blocks and then randomly shuffles the block order while simultaneously inserting some dead code blocks. Figure 19 shows a side by side comparison of two variants created by our code obfuscation engine (VIRUS1.asm and VIRUS2.asm) and illustrates the difference in code between the metamorphic variants. We can see the labels and the jump instructions inserted between the blocks and the differences in the block order. It is also evident that we keep the starting block in the same place. After creating the metamorphic variants of the original virus we assembled and linked these variants using the MASM assembler and Tlink linker and created executables for each of them (a Perl script was used to automate this process)
Testing metamorphic variants with commercial virus scanners
In the third phase of our experiments the metamorphic viruses created in the second phase were tested with an off-the-shelf scanner and a HMM based detector.
First the metamorphic viruses were scanned using the same scanner (McAfee VirusScan) used for checking the seed virus and it failed to detect the presence of any virus. Figure   20 shows a screenshot capture of McAfee VirusScan after it was run on the folder containing the 120 metamorphic virus executables generated by our code obfuscation engine. 1.1.6. Testing metamorphic variants using HMM based detection
Next our metamorphic viruses were tested against the HMM detector. First the executables were disassembled using the IDA pro disassembler and these assembly files were used for training the HMM.
Our naming convention was to name all the files containing virus assembly code with the 
Results
Once the HMM was trained the scores against the model file were obtained for both normal files and files belonging to the virus family. The scores for the viruses ranged between -2 to -8 (Appendix A) but for the normal files the scores ranged between -37 to -190 hence clearly separating the viruses from the normal files. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The principal aim of this project was to show that viruses that are provably undetectable using signature-based scanning, can nevertheless be reliably detected using machine learning techniques.. To this end we created a code obfuscation engine conforming to the rules in [1] . According to a proof given in [1], these viruses cannot be detected using signature-based scanning. This was validated, since the metamorphic viruses created by our engine were not detected by the same signature-based detectors that had successfully identified the seed virus the metamorphic variants were created from.
We then demonstrated that the metamorphic viruses created using our code obfuscation engine could be detected by the HMM based detector described in [2] . This was done by performing five-fold HMM validation on 120 different metamorphic viruses and comparing the normalized similarity scores for viruses and normal programs. In all the cases the score ranges for the viruses were markedly different from those for the normal files, hence the viruses were identifiable in the HMM method by their similarity scores alone. In this way we were able to provide empirical proof that metamorphic viruses undetectable by pattern based scanners can be detected by machine learning based methods.
A good future research project would be to design a metamorphic virus-creating engine that can evade both signature-based detection and HMM-based detection. This however is not a trivial task since it means the virus would have to be highly metamorphic to avoid signature based detection and at the same time it would also need to look like normal code (in terms of the statistical signature of its instruction sequence) to evade HMMbased detection. 
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